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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Section 78-2-2(4), 
U.C.A. (1953). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rules 8,12, 15 U.R.C.P., govern review for the first issue on appeal. Review 
is de novo, without deference to the District Court. Colonial Leasing v. Larson Bros. 
Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1998). 
Rule 24(a)(9), F.R.A.P governs the second issue on appeal. Appellant must 
marshal the evidence supporting the finding, which will not be overturned unless 
clearly erroneous. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d. 743, 751 (Utah 2002). 
The first issue on cross-appeal is a question of law under Rule 19, U.R.C.P. 
Review is de novo, without deference to the District Court. Colonial Leasing v. 
Larson Bros. Construction Co., supra. 
The second issue on cross-appeal is a question of law under § 78-27-56, U.C.A. 
(1953). Review is de novo without deference to the District Court. Colonial Leasing 
v. Larson Bros. Construction Co., supra. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Where, in response to a Complaint for judicial dissolution, the Answer 
asserts that judicial dissolution is barred by enforcement of a binding agreement for 
dissolution and the trial is bifurcated at defendants' request to try first the issue of 
existence of such an agreement, whether, to sustain such trial, the Complaint must be 
amended to assert a binding agreement for dissolution. 
2. Where the District Court finds a verbal agreement, sufficiently 
performed as to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and the making of an 
agreement and its performance are admitted, whether an objection that the evidence 
of performance might have been disbelieved or given a different construction suffices 
to overturn the judgment. 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether a defendant who acted as joint purchaser of a business is not a 
proper, or indispensable party in an action for enforcement of the purchase. Preserved, 
Tr. 1816, pp. 175-177. 
2. Whether, where the District Court finds that defendants acted in bad faith, 
and purposefully destroyed evidence which would have avoided trial, the court rejects 
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the defense as untrue, and it is shown in supplemental proceedings that defendants had 
deceived the court to avoid enforcement of the judgment, the District Court may 
decline to award fees and costs to plaintiffs. Preserved, Plaintiffs' Post-trial Brief, 
Appendix. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants' assertion that the issues not raised in the complaint may not be 
tried without amendment of the complaint is wrong. All issues raised in the 
"pleadings", including the answer, may be tried. Where the Answer interposes 
enforcement of a private dissolution agreement as a bar to the judicial dissolution 
sought by the Complaint, defendants may not complain that, without an amendment 
of the Complaint, the District Court may not try the issue of enforcement of a private 
dissolution agreement. 
It is insufficient, where defendants admit that a verbal agreement was made and 
performed, to overtlirow a judgment that an agreement was made and sufficiently 
performed to be enforceable, to dispute only whether some of the evidence might have 
been disbelieved or given another construction. 
Where the uncontested evidence shows that both defendants offered to 
purchase a business from plaintiffs, that both defendants represented that both would 
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pay the purchase price, that both defendants contributed assets and funds owned by 
each to payment of the purchase price, and that both defendants obtained equal shares 
in the business upon transfer, it was improper to release either defendant from the 
action and judgment. 
Where the District Court finds that the complaint arose from defendants' bad 
faith behavior toward plaintiffs, that the defense was untrue and without merit and that 
plaintiffs knowingly destroyed evidence which would have rendered trial unnecessary, 
the District Court is bound by §78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953) to award plaintiffs their fees 
and costs against defendants. 
FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are set out in the District Court's Findings of 
Fact numbers: 4,6,9,11,14,20,25,26,27,28,30,31,32,33,34,36,37,38,39,41, 
42,43,45 and 47 with brief supplementation. 
The supplemental facts are as follows: 
a. Straight Line Striping, Inc., ("SLS") was owned half by Kerin Cowley 
("Kerin") and half by Veralynn Porter ("Veralynn") at the time of its 
transfer to plaintiffs as part of the buy-out of Advanced Maintenance 
Services, Inc. ("AMS") by the defendant Porters. Exhibit 7, If 9. 
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b. The buy-out of AMS resulted in AMS being immediately transferred 
into the joint (50%/50%) ownership of Slone Porter ("Slone") and 
Veralynn. Finding No. 30; Exhibit 7, ff 5, 6; Tr. 1315, pp. 95, 97. 
c. All payments to Tracy & Kerin Cowley ("the Cowleys") by the 
Porters for the buy-out of AMS were from funds owned jointly by 
Slone and Veralynn. Testimony of Veralynn Porter, Tr. 1815; p. 190; 
Exhibit 7, f 6. 
d. Slone and Veralynn admit that the buy-out agreement between the 
parties required payment of the price "by Slone Porter and Veralynn 
Porter". Ex. 7,16; Transcript 1815, p. 190, lines 3-6. 
e. Several months before trial, AMS, reincorporated as Quality 
Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("QMS"), was transferred in entirety, and 
without substantial consideration, to Veralynn who then made all 
payments to the Cowleys through trial from funds belonging solely to 
Veralynn. Testimony of Slone Porter in supplemental proceedings, 
set out in Affidavit of Kerin Cowley, 10/08/04, Appendix. 
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS 
Rule 15, U.R.C.P. requires amendment of pleadings only where issues are tried 
which are "not raised by the pleadings". "Pleadings" include at least the Complaint 
and Answer. Rule 7, U.R.C.P. Where the Complaint seeks valuation and judicial 
dissolution of a business and the Answer (Eleventh Affirmative Defense) asserts that 
the claim is barred because the business "was properly dissolved" and the private 
dissolution agreement must be enforced instead, the issue of a private dissolution 
agreement and its enforcement has squarely been raised by the pleadings. There is no 
need to amend the Complaint to raise it. 
Defendant's brief asserts that "Mr. Porter . . . asserted an affirmative defense 
that AMS was properly dissolved based upon the parties' oral agreement reached July 
19,2002 . . . . " In fact, the Answer was made for both Porters and does not mention 
an agreement of July 19, 2002. See Appendix to Appellant's Brief. 
Defendants then escaped a motion for judgment on the pleadings because, 
given the breadth of defendants' claim "that there had been a dissolution of the 
corporation", it remained to be determined "whether the dissolution was proper or 
improper." Memorandum Decision, July 1, 2003, Appendix to Appellant's Brief. 
The Answer was, thus, promptly construed as raising the issue whether any proper 
dissolution had occurred, which, if enforced, avoided a judicial dissolution. 
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The issue of enforcement of a private dissolution in lieu of judicial dissolution, 
trial of which defendants now claim was unsupported by the pleadings, in fact was 
raised by defendants' own pleading. 
Defendants' further claim of lack of notice of the claim and opportunity to 
respond is equally disingenuous. Defendants were given ample notice by the order 
bifurcating the trial, which defendants had solicited. See Minutes, 01/02/04, 
Appendix. Further, defendants discussed the issue in their Trial Brief. See 
Defendants' Trial Brief, 05/28/04 at 3-4, Appendix. 
"What was at issue, according to the court's rulings prior to the trial, was 
whether there was an enforceable agreement to dissolve AMS. Once the court 
determined that there was, that should have been the end of the case, with judgment 
for Defendant and an order to dismiss the Complaint for judicial dissolution -
plaintiffs' only asserted cause of action." Appellants' Brief at 20. The District Court, 
defendant says, was not entitled to issue an order enforcing the "enforceable 
agreement to dissolve AMS." 
By submitting the issue whether judicial dissolution was barred by an 
enforceable agreement to dissolve, defendants necessarily submitted to the District 
Court's determination, or waived, all objections to enforcement of any agreement 
found. Unless the agreement was to be enforced, the Court was at liberty to dissolve 
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the corporation judicially. Defendants could not assert enforceability, while 
maintaining objections to enforcement; no more could they assert that any such 
agreement was unenforceable, yet barred a judicial dissolution. In short, the defense 
here was that enforcement of such agreement to dissolve as the Court might find 
should bar pursuit of judicial dissolution. Having sought enforcement of the 
agreement in lieu of judicial dissolution, defendants could hardly object after the fact 
that the Court ordered enforcement. Indeed, it can hardly be thought that, if the 
District Court had found the terms of the agreement to have been as alleged by 
defendants, they would now object to enforcement. The objection here is that, having 
submitted the issue what dissolution should be enforced, defendants dispute the 
dissolution selected by the District Court. 
PROPRIETY OF THE FINDINGS 
The District Court's ruling that an agreement was established by part 
performance in this case is sustainable upon a mere preponderance of evidence, or 
even if the evidence is evenly balanced. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d. 743, 751 (Utah 
2002), and cases there cited. This dooms defendant's claim that the findings below 
are clearly erroneous, insofar as it asserts at most that some evidence supporting the 
District court's conclusions could have been given a different interpretation in light of 
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other evidence. 
Further, defendant has neglected to contest central findings numbers 20,25,26 
and 27, rendering their contest of findings 33, 36 and 37 effectively moot. 
That is, defendants do not now contest that an agreement was reached on the 
terms for a buy-out, or even whether performance occurred; apparently, defendants' 
dispute is whether the performance was sufficient, in some undisclosed way, to 
demonstrate the agreement. Defendants' presentation, however, contains no evidence 
that contradicts Findings Nos. 36 and 37. These findings are fully supported by the 
evidence in support marshaled in defendant's brief. Apparently, defendant's 
objection is that the District Court should have chosen to disbelieve the evidence, or 
some part of it, and believed other parts. 
Uncontested Finding No. 20 establishes that: 
At the meeting [June 22,2002], the Porters indicated they wanted to buy 
out Tracy Cowley's interest in AMS. They offered to pay $600,000 in 
cash in monthly installments of $10,000/month paid over five years 
without interest, to transfer 100% of SLS to the Cowleys and to give 
Tracy Cowley his choice of the Listo properties with in Midway or the 
one in St. George. 
Uncontested Finding No. 25 is that: 
During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed among themselves 
that they would accept the buy-out terms submitted by the Porters, with 
certain changes that Mr. Cowley would submit to the Porters on June 24th. 
Mrs. Cowley was then committed to accompany a church youth group 
on a trip out-of-state early on June 24th. 
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Uncontested Findings Nos. 26 and 27 are that: 
On the morning of June 24,2002, Tracy Cowley came to the AMS office 
and met with Slone and Veralynn Porter. During that meeting, Mr. 
Cowley enumerated certain additional terms which he would accept in 
selling his portion of AMS to Slone Porter, which items were 
handwritten on a paper by Mrs. Porter. This meeting was also tape 
recorded by the Porters. 
These handwritten notes were then typed on a computer by Mrs. Porter. 
This document was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out" of which, two 
copies were printed. Mr. Porter signed one and placed it back on the 
desk. Mr. Cowley said that the terms were agreeable to him, but he 
wanted to read them to his wife before signing. He attempted to call her 
but couldn't get a clear connection on his cell phone. 
While circumstances arose which prevented Mr. Cowley then signing, these findings 
plainly establish at least a verbal agreement on the written terms. 
Defendants do not actually contest that there is evidence that the performances 
listed in Finding No. 33 did not occur. Perhaps they claim that some went beyond the 
specific terms written on June 24, 2002. As they were not inconsistent with the 
written terms, however, this is irrelevant, as is the apparent claim that the defendants 
did not complete all of what was required of them. It is conceded that the plaintiffs 
did everything required of them. 
That Mrs. Cowley may have believed that the bargain made was a bad one (Tr. 
1816 at 164-168) does not dispute its making. That when the Porters thereafter 
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attempted to avoid the agreement, Mrs. Cowley "might have said something like" 
expressing regret for not completing the deal when first offered on June 22, 2002 (Tr. 
1816 at 166) proves nothing. The allegation that the parties were still negotiating 
between June 27,2002 and July 19,2002 (cited to Tr. 1816 at 171-172), is disproved 
as selective reading of a deposition transcript. Tr. 1816 at 172-173. The allegation 
that "the total buy-out price was never agreed upon" (cited to Tr. 1816 at 171-172), 
simply misrepresents testimony that the Porters subsequently refused to pay. Tr. 1816 
at 173. 
The allegation that on June 27, 2002, rather than July 19, 2002, the Porters 
proposed different terms than agreed on June 24,2002 (cited variously to Tr. 1816 at 
39-40, 40-43, 43-47, 50, 51-52 and 52-54), is shown simply to have been a mistake 
about dates in prior discovery, corrected at trial. Tr.1816 at pp. 40-41. The 
corroborating testimony of the Porters is that they first broached a different deal on 
July 19, 2002, Tr.1814 at 108 et seq.; Tr. 1816 at 128 et seq. 
Mr. Cowley's assertion in the Complaint early in the proceedings that there had 
been no agreement reflected the advice of counsel that a verbal agreement was 
insufficient absent evidence of the sort which subsequently came to hand. (Tr. 1816 
at 14-15,25-27). 
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VERALYNN PORTER WAS A NECESSARY PARTY 
While there is a written order in this case dismissing as a defendant Veralynn 
Porter, there is no written rationale for the order, though the District Court was 
challenged repeatedly to provide one. See Order 07/07/04, Appendix. The only 
indication of a basis for the order is a brief exchange at the end of trial. That exchange 
indicates that Veralynn, sued as a purchaser of an interest in AMS, was dismissed as 
a defendant upon precisely the same basis as Mrs. Cowley was dismissed as a plaintiff, 
namely, that she was not a seller of AMS. 
In that exchange, counsel for defendants asserted: 
. . . we would make a motion . . . to dismiss both Kerin Cowley and 
Veralynn Porter as parties to this action on the grounds that. . . they were 
never shareholders of the company AMS. 
Tr. 1816 at 175. To this, the District Court responded: 
I have not seen evidence that would indicate that either of the wives of 
these two parties were, had an ownership interest in the business. . . . 
And therefore, the Court is going to grant the motion to dismiss Kerin 
Cowley and Veralynn Porter. 
Tr. 1816 at 177. 
It was irrelevant to whether Veralynn was a purchaser of AMS that she had no 
interest in AMS to sell. Further, the District Court had heard ample, uncontradicted 
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evidence, including the testimony of both of the Porters, that Veralynn Porter and 
Kerin Cowley had defined interests in subdivisions of AMS called Straight Line 
Striping ("SLS") and Listo, which Veralynn was required to transfer to the Cowleys 
as part of the "buy-out" of AMS, and that both Slone and Veralynn were obligated to 
pay for the acquisition of AMS, out of funds belonging half to Slone and half to 
Veralynn. 
The District Court's assertion that "I have not seen any evidence that would 
indicate that either of the wives of these parties were, had an ownership interest in the 
business", is disproven by a single exliibit. 
Exhibit 7, a Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement prepared by counsel for 
the Porters and which both of the Porters confirmed at trial, purports on its face to be 
"a written confirmation of the verbal agreement [which Porters claim was] entered 
into by the parties on or about June 22,2002." Exliibit 7, f 19. The document contains 
all of the following provisions, all of which were called to the District Court's 
attention and individually confirmed by defendants at trial (see testimony of Veralynn, 
Tr. 1815 at 189-191): 
3. The Parties hereby agree that one-half (1/2) of the cash assets from 
Advanced shall be distributed to Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley. 
4. Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter hereby agree to pay off Tracy 
Cowley's 2001 F350 vehicle, VIN # 1FTSX31F11EC34760. 
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5. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter 
incorporated a new company on July 1, 2002 known as Quality 
Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("Quality"), Federal Tax I.D. # 
04-3690183. Slone owns fifty percent (50%) of the company and 
Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%) of the company. 
6. The parties hereby agree that a cash payout of $240,000 will be paid 
out to Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley by Slone D. Porter and 
Veralynn Porter through their new company Quality. 
8. Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter, through their new company, 
Quality, hereby agree to pay the health insurance premiums for Tracy 
J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley through December 31,2002. 
9. The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line, Federal Tax I.D. # 
84-1429330, was owned by Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley, each 
owning fifty percent (50%) each. 
11. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to transfer her fifty percent (50%) 
ownership of Straight Line to Kerin Cowley on July 1, 2002. 
12.The parties hereby agree that Straight Line is now completely owned 
by Kerin Cowley as of July 1, 2002. 
13. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to be responsible for one-half (1/2) of 
the taxes owed by Straight Line through June 30, 2002. Veralynn 
Porter will be filing a final K-l at the end of 2002. 
14.The Parties hereby agree that Listo, Federal Tax I.D. # 87-0657135, 
was owned in equal shares of twenty-five percent (25%) by Slone D. 
Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy J. Cowley, and Kerin Cowley. 
15.The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter 
transferred their twenty-five percent (25%) interest in Listo to Tracy 
J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley, respectively, on July 1, 2002. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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While the parties disputed the $240,000 price asserted in Exhibit 7, both of the 
Porters affirmed that the document otherwise accurately expressed their 
understanding of the verbal agreement. The District Court's Finding No. 11 specifies 
that SLS was a subsidiary of AMS, while Finding No. 14 identifies Listo as a "holding 
company" for real estate purchased by AMS. The District Court's Finding No. 30 was 
that "the Porters took steps to form Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS") which the 
Porters incorporated o[n] June 25,2002, as owners to continue the maintenance work 
for 7-Eleven formerly done by AMS." 
Exhibit 7, therefore, demonstrates by admission of the Porters, not only that (1) 
Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter both "had an ownership interest in the business," 
but that (2) the obligation of the purchasers in the buy-out ran to both Tracy Cowley 
and Kerin Cowley and that (3) the obligation to pay for the buy-out ran personally 
from both Slone Porter and Veralynn Porter and was to be made from funds of a "new 
company", QMS, which company and, thus, which fimds, were owned fifty percent 
(50%) by Slone and fifty percent (50%) by Veralynn. 
If the District Court's order releasing Veralynn as a defendant was in fact based 
upon the irrelevant claim that she had no "ownership interest in the business", it was 
100% wrong. She owned fifty percent (50%) of Straight Line Striping and twenty-five 
percent (25%) of Listo, both of which interests were part of the transfers required in 
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the buy-out. 
More importantly, if the order was based upon some unexpressed conclusion 
that Veralynn Porter was not an obligor, it is also 100% wrong. She plainly assumed 
a personal obligation to pay for an asset - the business of AMS - of which she became 
fifty percent (50%) owner by transfer into a company, QMS, of which she owned half, 
representing that payment would be made from funds of which she owned half. 
The District Court simply chose to ignore the uncontested evidence. Perhaps 
most lamentable of all, the District Court learned in supplemental proceedings that 
many months before the trial, Veralynn, for $1.00, became the sole owner of QMS, the 
re-incorporation of AMS and thereafter, to the date of trial, made all of the payments 
defendants alleged were due from QMS funds belonging 100% to Veralynn Porter. 
The District Court, nevertheless, knowing then that Slone refused to pay the judgment 
because he had transferred all his assets to Veralynn, refused to alter its order 
releasing Veralynn as a defendant. 
It is entirely irrelevant to any of this that QMS was not joined as a party directly. 
QMS was not the obligor. As the District Court's Findings and Exhibit 7 show 
unequivocally, QMS did not even exist at the time, June 24, 2002, the terms of the 
buy-out were first agreed. That the purchaser of an asset subsequently transfers it into 
a solely-owned corporation created for the purpose, and thereafter pays part of the 
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price out of a corporate account, cannot create corporate immunity from the obligation 
to pay, without the consent of the seller. There is not a particle of evidence in this case 
that substitution of QMS for the Porters as sole obligor was even suggested to, let 
alone agreed by, the Cowleys. Exhibit 7, for example, makes it plain that payments 
were to be made "by Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter through their new company 
Quality", not by QMS. 
The District Court had before it ample, uncontested evidence, including the 
evidence underlying its own Finding regarding QMS, that Veralynn was not only at 
all times a proper party defendant, but an indispensable party defendant under Rule 
19, U.R.C.P. The only conceivable effect of releasing her as a defendant was to 
thwart enforcement of the judgment. When it was made plain to the District Court that, 
as previously warned, this had in fact occurred, the District Court refused to act in 
support of its own judgment. 
While the buy-sell agreement as written on June 24, 2002 calls for Slone to 
"keep" AMS, it contains no agreement limiting the obligation to pay for it to Slone. 
On the contrary, the document simply says that Tracy "will be paid." Further, the 
document provides that Tracy "will keep" Straight Line Striping as it currently exists." 
SLS was then owned half by Veralynn and half by Kerin and the transfer of a 
half-interest which subsequently occurred was from Veralynn to Kerin. In short, the 
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document on its face made Veralynn an obligor to complete the transaction. 
After an agreement was reached, but before the part performance commenced 
which the District Court found established the contract, the Porters incorporated QMS, 
owned half by Slone and half by Veralynn, to continue the business of AMS being 
acquired: 
Pursuant to instructions form Atkin [of 7-Eleven], the Porters took steps 
to form Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS") which the Porters 
incorporated on June 25, 2002, as owners to continue the maintenance 
work for 7-Eleven formerly done by AMS. 
Finding No. 30 (emphasis added). 
When, "after June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform the terms of the 
written buy-out agreement of June 24th" (Finding No. 33), the "previous AMS 
employees, equipment, stock account, books and premises" were delivered to "the 
Porters" jointly, to be operated as QMS, owned by the Porters jointly. Thereafter, all 
payments were made to the Cowleys from the account of QMS; that is, with funds 
belonging half to Slone and half to Veralynn. 
By July 19, 2002, as the first payment became due, the Porters asked that the 
Cowleys temporarily reduce payments to them: 
The Porters then indicated at the July 19th meeting, that because AMS 
was temporarily on a "time and material basis" pending re-building of the 
7-Eleven contracts in the fall, QMS could only afford to pay the Cowleys 
$4,000/month and not the $10,000/month they had previously offered 
and which the Cowleys had ultimately accepted. 
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Finding No. 36 (emphasis added.) 
The Cowleys agreed to accept reduced payments . . . as an 
accommodation to the Porters. The Parties, however, agreed that 
payments of $10,000/month would commence as soon as 7-Eleven 
renewed maintenance contracts with QMS and continue until $600,000 
had been paid. The 7-Eleven contracts were renewed in October 2002. 
Conclusion No. 3 (emphasis added.) 
It was QMS, the parties knew, which would rebid, and which obtained, the 
AMS contracts with 7-Eleven. Veralynn thus, the parties knew, became entitled with 
Slone to half each of the proceeds of such contracts, in the hands of QMS, as 
joint-owners of QMS. The representation of the Porters that they would pay from 
funds of QMS was a promise to pay from funds belonging jointly to Slone and 
Veralynn for an asset being acquired jointly by Slone and Veralynn. 
The agreement between the parties as performed and which the District Court 
found enforceable as performed, was for delivery of the Cowleys' share of AMS to 
an entity created for the purpose, QMS, owned and controlled jointly by Slone and 
Veralynn, in exchange for nayment from funds owned jointly by Slone and Veralynn. 
The entire evidence of agreement upon, and payment of, the obligation in this 
case, upon which the District Court bases the existence of a contract, is evidence of 
joint payment of a joint obligation by Slone and Veralynn. As the District Court found: 
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"The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month from August, 2002 through the 
time of trial." Finding No. 43 (emphasis added). 
Certainly, nothing in this evidence suggests an agreement that half of the assets 
and income of the business was to be sequestered from the obligation to pay by 
transferring it to Veralynn, because only Slone was obligated to pay. 
Where the District Court finds the existence of a contract in a specific history 
of performance, it is not at liberty to engraft upon the agreement a term which directly 
contradicts the consistent evidence and of which there is no independent evidence. 
Spears v. Warr, supra; Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983). 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the . . . defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought as asserted in good faith . . . . 
A defense is "without merit" where it is frivolous, or of little weight or 
importance, without basis in law or fact. Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. 
Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009 (Utah 2002); Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1997). 
A defense is in bad faith if defendant "(1) lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; or (2) intended to take unconscionable 
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advantage of others; or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities 
in question would hinder, delay or defraud others." Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753 
(Utah 2002); Childs v. Callahan, 993 P.2d 244 (Utah 1999). 
Where a meritless, bad faith defense is shown, it is inequitable not to award fees 
to plaintiff. Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, supra. 
Here the District Court concluded that, having made an offer for purchase of 
plaintiffs' interest in AMS, defendants engaged in a course of conduct in breach of 
their duty of good faith and fair dealing toward plaintiffs in order to coerce acceptance. 
The unilateral acts of the Porters in their interaction with representative 
of 7-Eleven from June 23,2002 through June 27,2002 were coercive of 
the Cowleys to sell their half interest in AMS. The Porters breached their 
duty of good faith and fair dealing contained within their duty of loyalty 
to their corporation and their co-owners. 
Conclusion of Law No. 6. 
Having coerced acceptance, defendants then destroyed the evidence of the 
agreement in breach of a promise to provide it to plaintiffs. 
Veralynn Porter testified at trial that she destroyed the tape recordings 
of the June meetings by throwing them into the Jordanelle Reservoir on 
a July 24, 2002 outing, which act made them unavailable for use at the 
trial and was contrary to her representation that she had destroyed them 
prior to the July 19th meeting of the parties. 
Finding of Fact No. 47. 
The purpose of defendants in doing so was to further the claim which became 
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their sole defense: that plaintiffs, having fully performed on their part, then agreed, in 
a meeting on July 19,2002 to defendants' demand to reduce the price to less than half. 
The lynchpin of the latter claim was the testimony of Slone that he received a 
phone call from Tracy on July 19,2002 acceding to defendants' demand. The District 
Court's Finding No. 37 recites this testimony, together with the contrary testimony of 
the plaintiffs; the District Court's Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 & 4 conclude that 
Slone's testimony about the phone call, like Veralynn's testimony about tape 
recordings, was a lie and that plaintiffs told the truth. 
Slone Porter testified at trial that Tracy Cowley called him on the evening 
of July 19, 2002 and accepted $4,000/month for five years as a final 
agreement to purchase Cowleys share of AMS. The Cowleys testified 
they agreed to accept $4,000/month to help the Porters out until the 
contracts were rebid to see if QMS was awarded the 7-Eleven contracts, 
as they were currently only being paid on a "time and material" basis and 
once QMS secured the 7-Eleven contracts, the $10,000/month for sixty 
months provision would be restored. 
The Cowleys agreed to accept reduced payments of $4,000/month from 
AMS through October 2002, as an accommodation to the Porters. The 
Parties, however, agreed that payments of $10,000/month would 
commence as soon as 7-Eleven renewed maintenance contracts with 
QMS and continue until $600,000 had been paid. The 7-Eleven 
contracts were renewed in October 2002. The parties never agreed to 
reduce the total amount due from Porter to Cowley to $240,000; the 
agreement has always been to pay $600,000. 
Even if the District Court had not found that Slone's claim about a phone call 
on July 19,2002 was false, because it was the only evidence of agreement upon a price 
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of $240,000 and because it was inconsistent with all of the other evidence including 
the testimony of the Cowleys, it could not meet the evidentiary standard for claims of 
part performance under the Statute of Frauds. E.g., Spears v. Warr, supra, AA P.3d. 
at 751; In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1949); Martin v. Scholl, supra. 
That is, the defense of an enforceable agreement to sell for $240,000 was always both 
without legal merit, because the evidence was insufficient, and in bad faith, because 
the evidence was false. 
Absent the claim that an enforceable contract at $240,000 had been made, 
plaintiffs were entitled to relief either by enforcement of the $600,000 agreement, or 
by judicial dissolution. In short, defendants' meritless, bad faith defense had no 
purpose other than to hinder and delay recovery by plaintiffs. 
The matter was gravely compounded by defendants' deceit upon the Court in 
obtaining the release of Veralynn Porter as a defendant. The District Court was 
warned that the request to dismiss Veralynn was not only contrary to her contribution 
of assets to the contract the Court had found performed and to her admitted status as 
purchaser and obligor, it was a ploy, by transferring the purchased business and its 
assets into her ownership, to render Slone Porter judgment-proof and avoid the 
payment of the judgment. Counsel for defendants then solemnly informed the Court 
that no such transfer had occurred. Tr. 1816 at 176. This followed direct testimony 
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by Slone that he was the owner of a new business, "True Green Land Care" ("TGLC"), 
into which the remaining assets of QMS had been converted. Tr. 1816, at 71-72. 
The truth, which became known in supplemental proceedings thereafter, was 
that Slone, for $1.00 had transferred QMS to Veralynn months before the trial. Realty 
purchased by AMS and formerly held by Listo, had then been pledged by the Porters 
as collateral for loans with which to purchase an interest in the new company. 
Affidavit of Kerin Cowley, 10/08/04, Appendix. 
The remaining physical assets of QMS were then transferred to TGLC, the 
stock in which was then transferred to Veralynn. Slone was given a subsistence salary 
by TGLC. In short, whatever remained of AMS, re-incorporated as QMS, had, in fact, 
been transferred to Veralynn, putting it out of reach of a judgment against Slone. Both 
Slone's testimony that he was the owner of TGLC, and counsel's representation that 
no transfers had been made to Veralynn to avoid the judgment, were false. 
While the District Court cogently observed that such transfers must be regarded 
as fraudulent (Tr. 1816 at 176-177), it has since acceded to defendants' claim that the 
fraud can only be addressed in a new action. Defendants' claim in that regard 
confirms the intent to delay and defraud. 
The District Court has found that the defense in this case was without merit. 
The defense that AMS was "properly dissolved" was supported only by a 
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presumptively inadequate claim of verbal contract, contrary to the Statute of Frauds. 
Literally all of the proffered evidence of the making or performance of the alleged 
contract would have been recognized at once as strictly referable to a different 
agreement, the one ultimately found by the Court, had defendants not destroyed the 
tape recordings. The defense, therefore, must be regarded as without basis in law or 
fact. The District Court's conclusion that defendants' testimony in support of the 
alleged agreement was false demonstrates bad faith. That conclusion is fully 
supported by the District Court's finding that defendants' behavior violated an 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
Where the District Court finds the defense both meritless and in bad faith, § 
78-27-56 is, on its face, mandatory. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant's appeal herein is without merit and should be dismissed. The order 
of the District Court releasing Veralynn Porter as a defendant must be reversed. 
Cross-Appellants should be awarded their fees and costs, including those on this 
appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 13m day of May, 2005. 
E. Craig.Smay 
Attorney for Plaihtiff Appellee 
Cross-AppeHam Cowley 
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